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This article' presents an analysis of the relationship
between private and collective agricultural sectors in a
socialist economy with special reference to Vietnam.
Any country which is going through a 'transition to
socialism' or which subscribes to 'scientific socialism'
shares the view of the founders of the Soviet Union
that the main means of production, of which land,
historically speaking, is the most important, must be
collectivised.2
The Family Sector - a Universal Phenomenon
It is also characteristic of socialist countries that the
land is not completely collectivised. Even where most
of the land is farmed by collective production units of
various types, the peasants have the option of farming
a plot of land on a private basis. The amount of land
available for this varies between five and ten per cent
of the cultivated land, but the option to farm a plot
does not give the right either to sell it or bequeath it. In
other words, farming rights do not involve property
rights. Descriptive labels vary - there seems to be
little distinction between 'private', 'personal', 'family'
and 'complementary' plots as descriptions, except for
ideological nuances. Systematic studies of the family
economy are scarce (with the notable exception of
Wadekin, 1973, on the 'private sector' in Soviet
agriculture). Briefly, the main characteristic of the
family plot is that the labour used on it is individual or
household labour, and the produce obtained from it is
either consumed by the producers themselves or sold
by them on the market in exchange for other goods
and particularly for money. While the purpose of this
exchange is to increase the consumption of the
producers, it cannot lead to the acquisition either of
more land or of industrial means of production.
Despite the insufficiency of the data available, we can
nevertheless hypothesize, on the basis of the Vietnam
case, that a fair amount of this cash income is hoarded.
'This paper is part of a broader study of the problems of
industrialisation in Vietnam, and was written during a stay
at the IDS as a Visiting Fellow. I would like to thank the IDS
for facilitating my research. My thanks also to Robin
Murray, Christine White, Gordon White and Olivier le Brun
for their comments (and to Judith Appleton for her
translation). The original longer French version appeared in
Vietnam, no 1, 1980.
2J use the term 'collectivisation' advisedly, rather than terms
like statisation, nationalisation or socialisation, all of which
lead to other debates beyond the scope of this article.
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The question of productivity in the private
sector One of the most controversial problems in
the analysis of socialist agriculture, is: which is more
'productive', the private or the collective sector?
Gregor Lazarcik's figures [1974] show unequivocally
that the private sector in Eastern European countries
is much more productive than the collective sector,
particularly in the case of animal husbandry and
vegetable growing. Benedict Stavis' [1979] figures for
China show that the peasants derive over 20 per cent of
their income from their private plots. Official figures
for Vietnam show that 65 per cent of the peasants' cash
income derives from their private plots, which
represent only five per cent of cultivated land. These
conclusions have led a number of economists to reject
collectivisation completely as a negative production
factor which is used to maintain political control over
the peasantry [Francisco 1979; Campbell 1974]. These
arguments call for the following comments:
comparing production in the two sectors is a very
problematic exercise. Comparisons based on cash
income ignore the price system: production in the
collective sector is measured in terms of the prices paid
by the state for deliveries, while private sector
production is measured in terms of free market prices.
In the case of Vietnam, the difference between these
two prices, which vary according to product and time
of year, can be enormous. Prices for pork noted during
a visit to Vietnam by the author will serve as an
example. For one kilogram of pork, the price was
1.65 dong for obligatory sales to the state; the incentive
price paid by the state for deliveries in excess of
production plan was 2.5 dong; the free market price
was 8 dong;
comparisons in terms of volume are no more
convincing, as the family and collective farms grow
different types of crops. Cereal production is primarily
in the collective sector. Vegetables and animal
products (meat, eggs, etc) are produced in both, but
they are labour intensive and the labour processes
involved in their production are extremely person-
alised. The vital factor here is the organisation of
labour and labour discipline;
e) at the aggregate level, productivity in fact involves
many factors other than property relations -
technology, capital, labour management, discipline
both within and outside the production unit, etc.
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Thus, in the absence an explanation of how legal
ownership as such plays an active role in determining
the productivity of labour, we are forced to conclude
that the case against collective agriculture put forward
by the authors quoted above is an idea that is an old as
anti-communism - that peasants, like capitalists, are
unable to work productively except on the basis of
individual incentives.
Is collectivisation necessary? We have already
established the existence of a broad consensus on the
necessity of collectivisation in socialist countries. First
there is the point, made with considerable force by
Dodd [1966], that this guarantees that agricultural
surplus in the countryside is gathered by the state. In
addition, collectivisation of land is a pre-condition for
a thoroughgoing system of water control, a very
problematic area in a country like Vietnam.
Collectivisation not only reduces the land wastage
involved in maintaining boundaries between privately-
owned pieces of land (these accounted for fully three
per cent of cultivable land in the Red River delta), but
also makes way for a new division of labour along with
mechanisation and agricultural innovation, none of
which is viable on sub-divided private land.
In analyses by economists in socialist countries,
especially in the 1950s and l960s, collective
production was frequently regarded as a guarantee of
the continuing socialist character of the country. The
various forms these units take (kolkhoz, sovkhoz, low-
level cooperative, high-level cooperative, people's
commune . ..) are considered equivalent to com-
parable degrees of socialisation. During the last
decade, however, this question has been subject to
some scrutiny. In the USSR, the sovkhoz is not very
different from the kolkhoz, and in China, the people's
communes are no longer presented as the model for an
elusive socialism.
It may be that a point is reached when one is forced to
recognise that complete collectivisation is neither
possible nor necessarily socialist (note, however, that
this view is still contested by some orthodox Marxists).
One is then able to reconsider the problem of the
private or family sector in terms of the rural
reproduction process. Put bluntly, the question is: why
is there such a large private sector (in terms of
individual cash income) in socialist economies and
what is its relationship to the collective sector?
Survivals, Complementarity, Transfer: Some
Theories
Without attempting an exhaustive analysis, we can say
that economists in socialist countries (and others)
have two broad explanations for the existence of the
private plot.
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The first is basically that private plots are one of the
concessions made by the state to the peasantry
[Dunman 1975] when land is collectivised. In other
words, the assumption is that when conditions are ripe
technically (modernisation), economically (sufficient
goods distributed by the state sector), and ideologically
(peasant collective consciousness) these plots will be
phased out in favour of completely collectivised
agriculture. The second explanation [Nguyen Xuan
Lai 1967] stresses complementarity of the relationship
between family and collective economies. They
occupy two different positions within agricultural
production and thus constitute two different sources
of peasant income: cooperative labour provides their
staple food needs (cereals), and 'family labour'
produces other foods (vegetables, eggs, meat, poultry)
as well as most of their cash income. We must add the
manufactured goods which the peasants obtain
through the cooperative. In other words, the two
sectors are linked, and there is thus a need to avoid
both 'leftist' attempts to eliminate the family
economy, and 'rightist' policies which favour the
family economy to the detriment of the collective
economy. The recommended balance should fuse
individual and collective interests.
These two theories (which are not necessarily
antagonistic) prompt the following comments. First,
implicit in the first theory of progress towards the
necessary disappearance of the private plot with the
advance of socialism is the idea that it is 'peasant
nature' to cling to the principle of private property and
to be motivated by more or less self-centred
considerations. Second, saying that the two types of
economy are complementary is to do no more than
recognise the real situation; it is in no way an analysis
of the relationship between the two economies. The
same lack of analysis would be evident in a
characterisation of the relationship between the sexes
as complementary. Moreover, this analysis gives no
clue to the social relations which allow these two
economies to be reproduced.
The Vietnamese case has recently been taken up in an
original and provocative manner by Alec Gordon
[1978]. He focuses on the importance of the private
plot for peasant incomes in Vietnam, and makes some
new points, which are summarised below:
a) the plots worked by private labour in fact exceed
the theoretical five per cent of cultivated land; an
additional approximately seventeen per cent of the
land has been illegally occupied. This quasi-
privatisation was made possible, according to
Gordon, by the disorganisation in the cooperatives in
the wake of the intensification of the war in the mid-
1960s. Moreover, Gordon sees no reason to exclude
the possibility of a 'spontaneous' development of a
new stratum of rich peasants, who acquired land
through their contacts and through deals made with
members of the state apparatus;
more private plots meant less collective land and
labour. Gordon calls this a 'zero sum game', on the
assumption that time spent on a private plot is time
lost to the cooperative;
Gordon's last, and most sophisticated, argument
is that an actual transfer of resources from the
collective land to the private plot takes place, made
possible by the difference between the value of the
labour force on the one hand and the price of the
products of this labour on the free market on the
other. In as far as the cooperatives guarantee the
peasants a sufficient quantity of their basic food needs
(320 kg per year) at low prices, they provide the basis
for them to reproduce themselves at low cost. Since
this is the same labour force that works on the private
plots, the products of the latter are similarly low cost,
which when sold on the free market give considerable
profit. If this profit remains in the private sector, it
may provide the basis for the de facto re-privatisation
of land suggested above.
Some comment is needed on this. First, the 'zero sum
game' is simply another way of saying that the
peasants prefer to indulge in private rather than
collective labour - in other words, the same old idea
of the individualistic character of the peasantry.
Gordon also suggests that complete collectivisation
would be a mark of socialist development. Neither of
these assertions, whether implicit or explicit, takes us
any further in our analysis.
Second, although the idea presented of a transfer of
resources by means of a system of differential values is
attractive, it is too confused. It is in fact very easy to
confuse the value of labour power, the price of labour
power, the value of products, production costs and the
sale price of these products. To take one example, it is
not possible to calculate an abstract value of labour
power. It is quite false to conclude that the value of
labour power is low because sufficient supplies of
paddy (the staple food) are provided by the
cooperati'es at low cost. This is to consider the
reproduction of the labour force purely from
nutritional or biological points of view both of which
are simplistic.
Nevertheless, the discussion of the value of the labour
force opens up interesting horizons. One is thereby led
to consider the concept of value, which according to
Marx is not a quantity of labour time but is above all a
specific form of control of labour and surplus labour
(Marx uses the term 'value form'). One is thus
confronted with the question of the nature of the
system of social relations within which peasants work,
the system through which this labour takes on a
specific form.
This question will now be examined under the general
theme of the control of labour and surplus labour in
Vietnamese agriculture. We must first note that the
controls are social rather than administrative or police
controls (although the latter have existed, or may still
exist as incidental controls). Social controls derive
from the logic of how the social system itself functions,
a logic which may be either encouraged or thwarted by
state policy.
Control of Labour and Surplus Labour: the
Role of the Family (Private) Plot
The key questions are:
- what is the function of the private plot in the
agricultural context?
- what are the means of control of labour and of
surplus labour in socialist agriculture?
The answer to these questions will throw new light on
the private plot: this land is neither the expression of
emerging capitalism, nor does it represent a
concession to 'egoistical peasant nature'. In order to
establish this point, we shall make a number of
comments on the Vietnamese experience of land
reform and the transition to socialism in the aftermath
of the war of national liberation against French
colonialism.
Private property and the labour process The
desire of impoverished Vietnamese peasants of the
Red River delta, after centuries of chronic famine, to
own land as a guarantee of their own utilisation of the
products thereof is neither a sign of capitalist
tendencies, nor proof of 'peasant individualism', Seen
in context, it is part of the struggle against the social
regulation imposed by famine, and against feudal
exploitation. Property in this historical context was a
form of distribution: land ownership was equated with
guaranteed disposition of part of the harvest (before
the moneylenders arrived on the scene).
Marx's explanation of the creation of surplus value
and exploitation is modelled on 'traditional' peasant
society: surplus value is the product of surplus labour
(as opposed to necessary labour) and is appropriated
by the owners of capital. Landlords appropriate part
of the harvest as rent, this rent being the other side of
the land ownership coin. Landlords were not
interested in the agricultural labour process as such.
Vietnam's colonial experience is a good example of
how landlords' wealth increased the more divided
their land was, ie, the more peasants were paying rent
as tenants. The important point for the landlord was
to control the harvest, or more precisely, to control the
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final product of the labour process. It is in this context
that we contend that the control of surplus labour is
effectively the same as controlling the agricultural
surplus.
However, Marx tells us that distribution is a mirror
image of relations of production. What are the
dominant relations of production where the peasant is
landowner and producer? We are provisionally
tempted to say that these are family relations of
production. Legal ownership of property is not a mere
ideological illusion but embodies relationships which
are extremely important for social reproduction, such
as inheritance, extended families, clans, marriage, etc.
Inheritance is both the framework in which land
ownership is transferred directly, as well as being a
powerful means of controlling the labour of children
and young people in the family unit. This implies a
double control when we add in the agricultural labour
process itself, which is based on the transmission of
empirical knowledge. Arranged marriages and
dowries are means of enforcing the system, and
possibly extending land ownership. Polygamy in pre-
colonial and colonial Vietnam was an example of how
the landlord might not only extend his property, but in
addition might also use his wives as very efficient
managers of his land. The range of women's labour
was fairly familiar - work in the fields, domestic
work, and 'trading', in addition to bringing up their
children.
Family stability and family relationships all derive
from a form of 'private property'. This being true, it is
easy to see why capitalist relations of production, most
pronounced in the case of landlessness (separation of
the producer from the means of production), also
imply the breakdown of the traditional family
structure and destabilisation of the family unit itself.
Collective Ownership, Mechanisation, and
the Control of Surplus Labour
Let us now return to the idea of ownership in the sense
of complete control by the producer of the labour
process on the land. The Vietnam Communist Party
stressed that after having solved the problem of
distribution by land reform (which was carried out
between 1953 and 1956 and led to a considerable
increase in peasant consumption), the labour process
itself must be transformed. The establishment of
cooperatives was supposed to introduce a new division
of labour, characterised by work specialisation and
mechanisation, a process implying reorganisation of
the whole of the rural labour force.
The question which now arises concerns the nature of
cooperative land ownership, especially as this form of
ownership is not a legal form, since the land belongs to
the state. Cooperative ownership is first of all a form
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of distribution to the peasant producers which takes
place through a system of work points. On the one
hand the peasants are allotted part of the cooperative's
products in kind, and rarely their cash equivalent, and
on the other they have access to manufactured goods
supplied by the state and sold at subsidised prices. The
cooperative also pays for all social expenses for health,
education and entertainment. Many cooperatives
have set up funds for scholarships to enable young
people to pursue their studies in town and return to
work in the village. The cooperative also takes
responsibility for transferring income to the state since
it handles all taxes. The equivalent of ten per cent of
the volume of all production in the cooperative is now
collected as a compulsory levy according to the most
recent decisions. The remaining 90 per cent is a
theoretical sum, as calculations are done on the basis
of planned rather than actual production. Cooperatives
may thus use any production in excess of the plan for
their own funds for collective consumption (but not
for investment or amortisation, all of which the state
takes care of).
We have shown that the cooperatives' role in
transferring income to the state has had a privileged
position for some time in discussions about the
necessity of collectivisation. But in a society as
threadbare as Vietnam has been during periods of war,
the role of the cooperative in guaranteeing the bare
necessities of life is fundamental. It is understandable
that the 'welfare cooperative' aspect be stressed in this
context. But this should not obscure the fact that it is
only peasant surplus labour that makes a new division
of labour possible, and that neither service activities
nor industrialisation are on the cards before the food
problem has been resolved.
The question is one of knowing exactly what form the
control of surplus labour takes in a cooperative. As
private property disappears, there is a parallel
reduction of 'traditional' control over surplus labour.
However, while formal property relations may change
suddenly, as the result of legislation, the change in
control is a gradual social process, which takes place
under specific conditions, both socio-economic and
socio-technical. The socio-economic conditions are: a
real mass movement based on voluntary support for
collectivisation, a social policy which consolidates the
'welfare cooperative's' role at the outset; pricing and
exchange policies which ensure a balance between
agriculture and the other sectors, particularly the
industrial sector. The necessary socio-technical
conditions are: the establishment of an 'undifferent-
iated' labour process based on mechanisation, a
growing division of labour, and a means of control
different from the family and landlord forms of labour
control discussed above.
Considering these conditions together makes it easier
to understand the constant balancing between
economic and technical poles typical of socialist
agriculture. Satisfying only one of these conditions at
a time (eg mechanisation, use of chemicals) gives little
information about the socialist character of this
method of control. On the basis of the above remarks
and an analysis of policies in the New Economic Zones
since 1976, we can see emerging another form of
control of surplus labour through the private plot. Let
us quickly review the context of the New Economic
Zones. As a means of dealing with population pressure
and the negative effects of the war (the most complex
of which is over-urbanisation), the Vietnamese
authorities have decided to reclaim land left fallow in
many areas and to clear cultivable land which was
inaccessible during the war. This reclamation is being
effected by voluntary relocation of the urban
population, who receive state aid for the first few
months, in the form of housing, food and farming
tools. There are two types of unit of production in
these areas - cooperatives and state farms. Families
who move there are allocated plots which altogether
make up five per cent of land area cultivated by the
newly formed cooperative. As the members of these
cooperatives receive a subsidy from the state, and the
labour process is the same as that on the state farms
(which mainly employ unmarried young people) the
difference between these two types of unit is the
existence of the private plot in the former but not the
latter. What is note-worthy about this phenomenon is
that this land is allocated to the family units by the
state. In other words, what we have here is not a
survival but a creation.
The aim of the labour process on these private plots is
above all to produce goods which the cooperatives'
labour process cannot provide under present
conditions. Pig-breeding, chicken rearing, vegetable-
growing and kitchen gardens are not efficient areas of
production unless industry provides inputs such as
chemical fertilizer, electricity, vaccines and small
agricultural machinery. The only exceptions are where
the products are destined for the family diet where
production is achieved by extremely personalised
labour. This manual labour is not particularly skilled,
and can be done intermittently, by old people,
children, or even by the cooperative producers at odd
moments during the day.
The plot thus becomes a workplace reserved for
members of the family unit and represents a guarantee
of the stability of that unit. The plot also allows the
productive worker to reduce his or her dead time. To
the extent that this worker is also a member of the
cooperative, and the means by which labour is
controlled becomes progressively more standardised
(fixed timetables, division of work into specialised
jobs etc) this dead labour time should in theory be
progressively reduced by the organisation of co-
operative labour. However, this does not happen, and
the private plot serves the purpose instead. In concrete
terms, the peasant's day is made up of eight hours
spent on the cooperative and four or five hours spent
on the private plot, with seasonal variations.
Such a long working day would be impossible, were it
not for the private plots. And this is the source of the
idea of complementarity mentioned above and
rejected as a simple empirical description. Our
rejection of the zero-sum-game concept of the
relationship between work on collective farm and
family plot is also made clearer. The only similarity
between the two types of work is that they are carried
out by the same person, whereas what we really have
to consider is two different sorts of control of surplus
labour. As long as this control is social, the corollary
of the private plot is that its producers be exchanged
on the free market, the usual place for the exchange of
goods between individual producers. Another corollary
is that the stability of the family unit is ensured, this
being both the condition for and the effect of the
'private' plot.
As long as the state, or more accurately the
cooperatives, are unable to take full control of the
land, (and according to Alec Gordon's figures, eight
per cent of the land is outside their control, in small
plots or inaccessible spots) it would be disastrous not
to let individual workers use it. This in fact was one of
the most important policies adopted by the Sixth
Plenum of the Vietnam Communist Party in
September 1979. Similarly, far from prohibiting the
free market, the Party has done no more than stress the
necessity of controlling it in order to prevent
trafficking detrimental to the state. These policies
show realism and adaptation to the present situation.
In what way is the private plot a specific form of
control of surplus labour in socialist agriculture? On
the basis of our remarks above, we are tempted to
reply that the plot, at the moment, is a form of
redistribution of wealth which takes into account the
difference in family size and consequently differing
labour capacity. The plot also provides a basis on
which the peasants can resist control of surplus labour
of the industrial sort, and thus maintain relative
stability and control over their equipment. This is not
however to skate over the contradictions which the
private plot conceals: it maintains the subordination
of women, it is the basis on which child labour can be
exploited, and it can lead to both clannishness and
favouritism. Nor must one present the private plot as
the major factor in agricultural development.
It is important to stress that the private plot
phenomenon is reproduced in specific conditions
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which must be enumerated. The way the Vietnamese
authorities approach family plots is realistic, and
conforms with the idea of socialism as conscious and
collective control of living conditions and labour.
Finally, will the private plot be abolished under
'developed socialism', with its high degree of
mechanisation, or under a more generalised and de-
personalised system of control of labour? Will certain
forms of the family, the 'market', and even the
'private' labour force disappear with it? Whether the
answer is yes or no is not very relevant to present
research: the future of these social formations is not
given in the present, but will be determined rather by
ongoing social struggles, the results of which cannot
be predicted.
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